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CRIMINALS, CLASSROOMS, AND KANGAROO 
COURTS: WHY COLLEGE CAMPUSES SHOULD 
NOT ADJUDICATE SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES 
Ashley Sarkozi* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
College is an incredible time for personal growth. It provides 
numerous avenues and opportunities for academic achievement, 
intellectual evolution, and career development. The college campus 
also provides many opportunities for social interaction, engaging 
peers, and developing relationships. As such, the college adventure 
also includes the exploration and development of sexual experiences. 
For the most part, these encounters occur agreeably and without 
major complication aside from the hurt feelings that may be 
attendant to misunderstood or misplaced passion. Sometimes, 
however, campus sexual encounters go terribly wrong. 
Take, for example, John Doe and J.C.—college students at 
Brandeis University.1 The two met as freshmen in the fall of 2011, 
where they began a romantic and sexual relationship.2 However, 
between their sophomore and junior years, J.C. broke up with John.3 
They remained friends for four months after, but then their 
relationship deteriorated.4 In January 2014, two years and four 
months after their relationship first began and six months after their 
relationship ended, J.C. “observed that a gay male student seemed to 
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 1. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 570 (D. Mass. 2016). 
 2. Id. at 574. 
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 4. Id. 
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be attracted to John.”5 John believed that J.C., who was also attracted 
to the student, was jealous of John.6 On January 13, 2014, J.C. sent 
the student a Facebook friend request, which the student denied.7 The 
very next day, January 14, 2014, J.C. filed a complaint against John, 
accusing him of sexual assault.8 The allegations read as follows: 
“Starting in the month of September, 2011, the Alleged violator of 
Policy [John] had numerous inappropriate, nonconsensual sexual 
interactions with me. These interactions continued to occur until 
around May 2013.”9 
After 2011, likely in response to federal pressure under Title 
IX,10 Brandeis changed its procedures for sexual misconduct cases, 
removing many protections it previously had in place for student 
defendants.11 By 2014, Brandeis had eliminated a hearing of any 
kind.12 These procedures made the entire process one of secrecy, 
preventing the accused from knowing the details of the charges, 
seeing the evidence (including a report made by the university), 
obtaining an attorney, cross-examining the accuser and other adverse 
witnesses, and effectively appealing the decision.13 John alleges that 
after J.C. filed his complaint, John was removed from his residence, 
classes, paid campus job, community advisor position, and student-
elected position on a University Board.14 All these actions were 
based solely off the two-sentence allegation.15 
Next, a “Special Examiner” process began, in which the Special 
Examiner, who was an outside lawyer, interviewed John, J.C., 
administrators, and other witnesses provided by the parties.16 The 
Special Examiner then compiled a report based off these 
interviews.17 John was never provided notes from the interviews of 
J.C.’s witnesses, was not allowed to confront or cross-examine his 
 
 5. Id.  
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 7. Id. 
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accuser or any of the witnesses, and was not provided the Special 
Examiner’s report until after his case was closed.18 In the report, the 
Special Examiner concluded that John had committed sexual 
violence when, during the span of their nearly two-year long 
relationship, John kissed J.C. when he was sleeping, looked at his 
private areas in the communal bathrooms, and at one point a year and 
a half into their relationship tried to perform oral sex on J.C. and 
when J.C. objected, John slept on the floor.19 The Special Examiner 
also found that John committed sexual violence when, in the 
beginning of their relationship, John put his hand on J.C.’s groin, and 
J.C. removed John’s hand after a period of time.20 After the Special 
Examiner made these findings, the Dean of Academic Services was 
chosen to act as a final decision maker.21 The Dean accepted the 
findings unilaterally, without the recommendation of any panel.22 
Following the Dean’s acceptance of the Special Examiner’s 
findings, a panel of three University administrators recommended a 
sanction of a “disciplinary warning,” despite never deciding the 
merits of the case itself.23 This punishment required John to undergo 
sensitivity training and resulted in a mark on John’s permanent 
record stating that he was found responsible for sexual misconduct.24 
John appealed the decision, and the appeal was rejected.25 After his 
appeal, John’s reputation was tarnished in multiple news stories, 
including one in which J.C. claimed John “anally raped” him.26 
Brandeis students “publicly taunted and accused John of rape,” he 
was fired from his internship, and another potential employer 
stopped responding to his emails.27 
John sued the university, and a federal district court in 
Massachusetts found that John’s disciplinary hearing lacked basic 
fairness.28 Despite Brandeis being a private school, the court found 
that John’s hearing lacked procedural fairness because he was not 
 
 18. Id. at 583–84. 
 19. Id. at 587–89. 
 20. Id. at 587. 
 21. Id. at 584. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 585. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 592. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 601–08. 
126 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:123 
 
given notice of his charges, he had no right to counsel, he had no 
right to confront his accuser, he had no right to cross-examine other 
witnesses, he had no right to examine evidence or witness 
statements, he had no right to call witnesses and present evidence, he 
had no right to an effective appeal, he had no access to the special 
examiner’s report, there was no separation of investigation, 
prosecution, and adjudication functions, and the university used a 
burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence) lower than the one 
used for all other forms of student misconduct (clear and 
convincing).29 
This case is not an isolated incident. There are currently 110 
lawsuits against colleges and universities alleging due process 
violations in sexual assault cases.30 Robert Shibley, Senior Vice 
President of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, 
estimates that he receives two calls a week from students who claim 
that they were falsely accused of sexual assault in campus 
disciplinary proceedings.31 A student found responsible for sexual 
assault can not only be suspended or expelled from school, but the 
student’s permanent record can be tarnished, thereby limiting the 
student’s educational, employment, and housing opportunities.32 
Additionally, a student found guilty can be permanently stigmatized, 
which can cause severe adverse impacts in the student’s professional 
and personal life.33 A federal judge explained that a finding of guilt 
can have significant consequences for post-graduate educational and 
employment opportunities, and will likely cause substantial social 
and personal repercussions similar to those of a criminal 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Welcome to Title IX for All, TITLE IX FOR ALL, http://www.titleixforall.com/#section-
legal-risk-management (last visited Aug. 21, 2016). 
 31. Robert Carle, The Trouble with Campus Rape Tribunals, PUB. DISCOURSE (July 14, 
2014), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/07/13369. 
 32. See, e.g., Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 601 (Sanctions include “ineligibility for 
campus housing, loss of opportunity to participate in campus actives or employment, suspension, 
and expulsion.”); Justin Wm. Moyer, University Unfair to Student Accused of Sexual Assault, 
Says California Judge, WASH. POST (July 14, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/07/14/judge-ucsd-used-unfair-
procedures-when-it-found-male-student-responsible-for-sexual-misconduct (The student, who 
was found guilty of sexual assault, was suspended for over a year, meaning he would need to 
reapply to the university.). 
 33. Emily Shire, Sexual Assault: The Accused Speak Out, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 26, 2016) (The 
accused, who was branded a rapist, suffers from depression and insomnia as a result of being 
found guilty in what he claims was an unfair campus adjudication.). 
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conviction.34 One student explained the consequences he faced from 
the allegations alone, stating: 
The complaint lodged against me caused me and my family 
immense grief, and as a simple Google search of my name 
reveals, its malignant effects have not abated. It cost me my 
reputation and credibility, the opportunity to become a 
Rhodes scholar, the full-time job offer I had worked so hard 
to attain, and the opportunity to achieve my childhood 
dream of playing in the NFL. I have had to address it with 
every prospective employer whom I’ve contacted, with 
every girl that I’ve dated since, and even with Harvard Law 
School during my admissions interview. It is a specter 
whose lingering presence is rooted in its inexplicability.35 
This Note argues that sexual assault adjudications do not belong 
on college campuses because colleges cannot provide a sufficient 
level of due process to defendants. Part II explores the background of 
sexual assault legislation for college campuses that receive federal 
funding. Part III analyzes the specific due process issues in campus 
proceedings, including mandating a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, prohibiting defendants from cross-examining witnesses, 
limiting defendants’ right to counsel, and exhibiting clear biases 
against defendants. Part IV concludes that sexual assault 
adjudications do not belong on college campuses because they 
cannot provide adequate due process rights for the accused. 
II.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  Title IX 
Congress first began to address the problem of sex 
discrimination on college campuses in 1972, when it amended the 
Higher Education Act and enacted Title IX.36 Title IX states that 
“[n]o person in the United States, shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
 
 34. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 601–02. 
 35. Patrick Witt, A Sexual Harassment Policy That Nearly Ruined My Life, BOS. GLOBE  
(Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/11/03/sexual-harassment-policy-that-
nearly-ruined-life/hY3XrZrOdXjvX2SSvuciPN/story.html. 
 36. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
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receiving federal financial assistance.”37 Title IX was not originally 
designed to address the adjudication of sexual harassment claims, 
and nothing in its legislative history nor in its first seven years of 
existence suggests that it was.38 Rather, Title IX originally helped 
women make significant strides in their representation and 
participation in collegiate athletics.39 In fact, Title IX has been 
credited with the creation of the Women’s Basketball Association 
and the U.S. women’s soccer team’s victory in the 1999 World 
Cup.40 
In 1979, the public attention shifted to the issue of sexual assault 
on college campuses when Catharine MacKinnon published a book 
in which she argued that sexual harassment is a form of 
discrimination.41 In 1980, the National Advisory Council on 
Women’s Education Programs reviewed Title IX, concluded it 
should be interpreted to prohibit sexual harassment, and urged the 
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) to 
implement regulations.42 Over the next thirteen years, OCR issued 
administrative guidance prohibiting school employees from sexually 
harassing students.43 It was not until 1992 that the Supreme Court 
recognized that sexual harassment could fall under Title IX gender 
discrimination.44 
In 1997, the OCR published its first Sexual Harassment 
Guidance (“1997 Guidance”), which described two types of conduct 
that constitute sexual harassment under Title IX: quid pro quo 
harassment and hostile-environment harassment.45 Quid pro quo 
harassment occurs when a school employee “conditions a student’s 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual 
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 51 (2013); see Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 664 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“When Title IX was enacted in 1972, 
the concept of ‘sexual harassment’ as gender discrimination had not been recognized or 
considered by the courts.”). 
 39. Barclay Sutton Hendrix, Note, A Feather on One Side, a Brick on the Other: Tilting the 
Scale Against Males Accused of Sexual Assault in Campus Disciplinary Proceedings, 47 GA. L. 
REV. 591, 601 (2013). 
 40. Id. at 601–02.  
 41. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF 
SEX DISCRIMINATION 143–49 (1979). 
 42. Hendrix, supra note 39, at 601. 
 43. Henrick, supra note 38, at 51. 
 44. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). 
 45. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other 
Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,038 (Mar. 13, 1997). 
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participation in an education program or activity or bases an 
educational decision on the student’s submission to unwelcome 
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal, 
nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”46 Hostile-
environment harassment refers to any sexually harassing conduct, 
which can include unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, or other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature “by an employee, by another student, or by a third party that is 
sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a student’s ability 
to participate in or benefit from an education program or activity, or 
to create a hostile or abusive educational environment.”47 This meant 
that schools were required to take action based on the conduct of 
students if those schools knew or should have known of the 
harassment, and failing to effectively do so would result in Title IX 
violations.48 
Some portions of the 1997 Guidance were supportive of student 
defendants, limiting public disclosure of the names of the accuser 
and the accused and stating that procedures should ensure due 
process rights for students at public universities, as well as any 
additional rights created for public or private university students 
under state law.49 However, other portions limited the rights of the 
accused. For example, while the 1997 Guidance said due process 
rights should be ensured, it failed to explicitly lay out what 
procedures would constitute adequate due process. Another portion 
required a school to process a sexual assault case even if a criminal 
case was pending.50 This meant that the defendant could be forced 
either to testify or face expulsion if not provided the right against 
self-incrimination.51 These statements could then be used in a 
subsequent criminal proceeding, obliterating Fifth Amendment52 
protections against self-incrimination in that trial.53 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 12,038–40 (“Schools are required by the Title IX regulations to adopt and publish 
grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of sex discrimination 
complaints, including complaints of sexual harassment, and to disseminate a policy against sex 
discrimination.”). 
 49. Id. at 12,037, 12,045. 
 50. Id. at 12,045. 
 51. Henrick, supra note 38, at 58. 
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 53. Henrick, supra note 38, at 58. 
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Until 1999, the Supreme Court had not addressed whether Title 
IX could make a school liable for failing to respond to sexual 
violence between two students. In Davis v. Monroe County Board of 
Education,54 a case in which a public school fifth-grader accused her 
classmate of sexual assault, the Supreme Court expanded Title IX’s 
harassment prohibitions to include cases of student-to-student 
conduct.55 The Court held that for a school to be liable for a private 
cause of action under Title IX, it must act with “deliberate 
indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or 
activities,” where the harassment is “so severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to 
educational opportunity or benefit.”56 
OCR issued a Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance in 2001 
(“2001 Guidance”), which focused on preventing and remedying 
sexual harassment in schools.57 In its 2001 Guidance, OCR again 
stated that a school may be subject to administrative enforcement 
under Title IX if it either knew or should have known of the 
harassment—a standard for liability that is much easier to meet than 
the actual knowledge standard employed by the Supreme Court for 
private causes of action in Davis.58 While the 2001 Guidance focused 
heavily on rights of complainants, it did little to help due process 
rights for defendants. Instead, it included a new heading entitled 
“Due Process Rights of the Accused,” which used language from the 
1997 Guidance in a rearranged form and failed to actually give 
explicit due process rights to the accused.59 Both Guidances focused 
on the rights of the complainants and failed to include any direction 
regarding a university’s obligation to provide specific due process 
rights to the accused. 
B.  Dear Colleague Letter 
On April 4, 2011, OCR issued a “Dear Colleague” letter (the 
 
 54. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 55. Id. at 633. 
 56. Id. 
 57. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD 
PARTIES (2001) [hereinafter REVISED GUIDANCE], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ 
docs/shguide.pdf. 
 58. Compare id.at iv, with Davis, 526 U.S. at 633. 
 59. Henrick, supra note 38, at 58–59; see REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 57, at 22. 
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“Letter”) addressing the issue of sexual assault on college 
campuses.60 The Letter was sent to every college and university 
receiving federal funding.61 The Letter explained that the 
requirements under Title IX pertaining to sexual harassment also 
applied to sexual violence, which could include rape, sexual assault, 
sexual battery, and sexual coercion.62 It outlined vague procedures 
that colleges should follow to comply with Title IX, including 
publishing a notice of nondiscrimination, designating an employee to 
coordinate Title IX compliance, and adopting and publishing 
grievance procedures.63 The Letter required schools to conduct a 
“prompt, thorough, and impartial” investigation into sexual assault 
allegations.64 If a school finds that harassment occurred, it must stop 
the behavior, prevent its recurrence, and remedy its effects on the 
victim.65 
While OCR claimed it did not change the law, it instructed 
schools on how OCR interprets the law.66 In response, many schools 
amended their procedures for adjudicating sexual assault 
allegations.67 Further, several of these interpretations seemed to 
create entirely new laws. For example, the Letter stated that schools 
must now handle complaints of sexual assaults that occurred off 
campus.68 Schools previously had no obligation to investigate 
alleged sexual assaults that occurred off campus.69 The Letter also 
required that a preponderance of the evidence standard be used in 
campus adjudications.70  
The Letter, while nineteen pages, included a mere two sentences 
discussing the due process rights of the accused.71 It stated, “[p]ublic 
 
 60. Letter from Russlyn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to 
Colleague (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/ 
list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. 
 61. Id. at 1. 
 62. Id. at 1–2. 
 63. Id. at 5. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 4. 
 66. Id. at 1 n.1. 
 67. Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www. 
bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2 
UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html. 
 68. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 60, at 4. 
 69. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999); Lam v. Curators of the 
Univ. of Mo., 122 F.3d 654, 656 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 70. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 60, at 4. 
 71. Id. at 12. 
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and state-supported schools must provide due process to the alleged 
perpetrator. However, schools should ensure that steps taken to 
accord due process rights to the alleged perpetrator do not restrict or 
unnecessarily delay the Title IX protections for the complainant.”72 
Even in the two sentences that were designated to the rights of the 
defendant, the Letter caveated these rights with the rights of the 
complainant, framing them as applicable only insofar as they did not 
delay or restrict any protections of the complainant. Finally, the 
Letter failed to provide a mandatory appeals process.73 This is 
especially harmful to the wrongly accused, who have no direct 
administrative mechanism through which to challenge a wrongful 
guilty finding. 
C.  The Campus SaVE Act 
In March 2013, President Obama signed the Campus Sexual 
Violence Elimination Act (the “Campus SaVE Act”) into law as part 
of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act.74 The Campus 
SaVE Act applies to almost all institutions of higher education, since 
it is directed toward those that participate in financial aid programs 
under Title III and Title IV.75 The Campus SaVE Act codified many 
provisions of the Letter.76 For example, it incorporated the Letter’s 
prompt and impartial internal investigation and resolution procedures 
and its requirement that alleged sexual assault victims be advised of 
their right to file internal complaints, criminal complaints, or both.77 
By contrast, the statute did not require a preponderance of the 
evidence standard as set forth by the Letter, but rather mandated only 
that institutions must specify the standard of evidence they will use.78 
The statute also allowed both parties to have others present at the 
proceeding, including an advisor of their choice.79 However, whether 
or not this advisor may be a lawyer is ambiguous, and whether or not 
this advisor may speak is equally ambiguous. 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 304, 127 
Stat. 54, 89–92 (2013) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)). 
 75. Id. § 304(a)(5), 127 Stat. at 90 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(A)). 
 76. Susan Hanley Duncan, The Devil Is in the Details: Will the Campus SaVE Act Provide 
More or Less Protection to Victims of Campus Assaults?, 40 J.C. & U.L. 443, 453 (2014). 
 77. § 304(a)(5), 127 Stat. at 89–92 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B)). 
 78. Id. § 304(a)(5), 127 Stat. at 90 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(A)(ii)). 
 79. Id. § 304(a)(5), 127 Stat. at 91 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iv)(II)). 
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D.  Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence 
On April 29, 2014, OCR issued a Questions and Answers 
document (the “Document”), which aimed to provide schools with 
additional guidance regarding their obligations under Title IX.80 The 
Document reiterated that the definition of sexual violence falls under 
sex discrimination, and that this could include rape, sexual assault, 
sexual battery, sexual abuse, and sexual coercion.81 Sexual 
harassment, on the other hand, incudes unwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature.82 In a Title IX Resource Guide released 
shortly after the Document, OCR added that sex-based harassment 
could include verbal acts and name-calling, could be based off the 
student’s actual or perceived sex or sexual orientation, and did not 
necessarily need to be conduct of a sexual nature.83 Thus, violent acts 
of rape and sexual assault were now officially lumped into the same 
adjudicatory procedures as simple acts of teasing. 
Next, OCR clarified that in determining whether a hostile 
environment has been created under Title IX, a school should 
evaluate both objective and subjective perspectives.84 However, the 
Document then stated in the next sentence that the standard is a 
reasonable person in the alleged victim’s position,85 implying an 
objective, rather than subjective, standard.86 Further, schools can be 
responsible for violating Title IX even if the alleged victim does not 
report the incident.87 A school can also be required to take action 
even if the alleged perpetrator is not a student at that school.88 
 
 80. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS,  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE 
IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE ii (2014) [hereinafter QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS], http:// 
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf. 
 81. Id. at 1. 
 82. Id. 
 83. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS,  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE 15–16 
(2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-title-ix-coordinators-guide-201504. 
pdf. But see Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 667 (1999) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“A university’s power to discipline its students for speech that may constitute sexual 
harassment is . . . circumscribed by the First Amendment.”). 
 84. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 80, at 1. 
 85. Id. 
 86. In both the civil and criminal context, the reasonable person standard has been viewed as 
an objective one. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 (1965) (The standard of the reasonable 
man is an objective one.); see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004) (holding 
the Miranda custody test is a reasonable person test, which depends on objective factors).  
 87. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 80, at 2. 
 88. Id. at 9. (While the appropriate response will differ depending on the school’s control 
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The Document reiterated that schools are required to have a 
Title IX coordinator who should not have a job that creates a conflict 
of interest—such as also serving as general counsel to the school in 
legal claims alleging Title IX violations.89 It also explained other 
conflicts of interest, such as a Title IX coordinator also serving as the 
Director of Athletics, serving as the Dean of Students, or serving on 
a hearing board of an appeal.90 Yet, notably, it failed to mention that 
Title IX coordinators should not partake in multiple roles of 
investigator, attorney, and judge in campus adjudicatory proceedings. 
OCR emphasized in the Document that the Campus SaVE Act 
did not alter a school’s Title IX obligations.91 This includes the 
preponderance of the evidence standard set out by the Dear 
Colleague letter.92 Cross-examination is still substantially limited, as 
the Document strongly discouraged parties from questioning one 
another, and it instead suggested that a trained third-party, such as 
the hearing panel, should ask the questions they deem appropriate.93 
Further, a school is not even required to allow a defendant to cross-
examine other witnesses.94 Finally, while an appeals process was 
recommended, it is still not required.95 
E.  Enforcement of Title IX and the Campus SaVE Act 
If OCR receives a complaint that a college or university has 
violated its Title IX obligations, it will begin enforcement 
procedures.96 OCR will investigate the school and attempt to secure 
voluntary compliance.97 If unsuccessful, OCR can refer the 
institution to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution and 
may begin proceedings to terminate the institution’s federal 
funding.98 The reality, however, is that OCR has never used its 
power to terminate federal funds, and Title IX enforcement hardly 
 
over the alleged perpetrator, a school should report incidents to the alleged perpetrator’s school 
and encourage it to take action.). 
 89. Id. at 11–12. 
 90. Id. at 12. 
 91. Id. at 44. 
 92. Id. at 26. 
 93. Id. at 31. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 37. 
 96. Henrick, supra note 38, at 55. 
 97. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 60, at 16. 
 98. Id. 
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ever becomes adversarial.99 “[T]he threat of losing [federal money] is 
enough to secure ‘voluntary’ compliance with OCR’s requests.”100 
OCR can only go after schools; it does not have the authority to 
punish an accused student, which is left to the institution.101 
In May 2014, OCR published a list on its website of all schools 
under investigation for “possible violations of federal law over the 
handling of sexual violence and harassment complaints.”102 The 
number grew from 55 in May 2014103 to 195 as of June 2016 and 
continues to rise.104 However, these investigations can take years to 
complete, leaving schools confused regarding the legal sufficiency of 
their policies.105 As a result of these investigations, schools have 
changed their sexual assault policies, taking away due process rights 
for the accused in the process.106 
To add to this confusion, the U.S. Department of Education is in 
charge of enforcing the Campus SaVE Act.107 As of March 2014, 
complainants can file a formal complaint with the Clery Act 
Compliance Division when a school violates their rights under 
SaVE.108 A school may face warnings or fines up to $35,000 per 
 
 99. Kristin Jones, Lax Enforcement of Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault Cases, CTR. FOR 
PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 25, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/02/25/4374/lax-
enforcement-title-ix-campus-sexual-assault-cases-0. 
 100. Henrick, supra note 38, at 55. 
 101. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 247 (2009) (“Title IX reaches 
institutions and programs that receive federal funds . . . which may include nonpublic 
institutions . . . but it has consistently been interpreted as not authorizing suit against school 
officials, teachers, and other individuals.”). 
 102. U.S. Department of Education Releases List of Higher Education Institutions with Open 




 103. Id. 
 104. Tyler Kingkade, There Are Far More Title IX Investigations of Colleges than Most 
People Know, HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2016, 4:49 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/title-ix-investigations-sexual-
harassment_us_575f4b0ee4b053d433061b3d (As of June 2016, “there were 246 ongoing 
investigations by the U.S. Department of Education into how 195 colleges and universities handle 
sexual assault reports under the gender equity law. A Freedom of Information Act 
request . . . revealed another 68 Title IX investigations into how 61 colleges handle sexual 
harassment cases.”). 
 105. Janet Napolitano, Policy Essay, “Only Yes Means Yes”: An Essay on University Policies 
Regarding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 396 (2015). 
 106. Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, supra note 67. 
 107. Frequently Asked Questions, CAMPUS SAVE ACT, http://thecampussaveact.com/faq (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2016). 
 108. Id. 
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violation.109 Thus, schools could have both Title IX and Clery Act 
complaints against them and face multiple and possibly contradictory 
investigations and rulings. 
While United States v. Morrison110 struck down portions of the 
Violence Against Women Act that provided complainants a federal 
remedy against students accused of sexual assault,111 complainants 
can still seek federal recourse against their institutions for Title IX 
violations.112 Thus, in addition to OCR enforcing Title IX and the 
Department of Education enforcing the Campus SaVE Act, private 
individuals can also sue universities under Title IX. Thus, schools 
face the possibility of multiple liabilities and federal sanctions if 
found in non-compliance with Title IX. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Due process rights have been consistently recognized for 
students attending public colleges.113 In Goss v. Lopez,114 the 
Supreme Court held that even students facing a temporary 
suspension must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard,115 
noting in dictum that suspension over ten days or expulsions might 
require more robust procedures.116 Private schools’ disciplinary 
procedures, while facing less scrutiny, have been subject to a 
“fundamental” or “basic” fairness standard and must not be arbitrary 
or capricious.117 The Supreme Court has given greater deference to a 
university’s procedural requirements when the student’s dismissal 
was based on an academic dismissal rather than a violation of the 
rules of conduct.118 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 111. Id. at 627. 
 112. Henrick, supra note 38, at 74. 
 113. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) (recognizing that students 
attending a public college have a right to due process). 
 114. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
 115. Id. at 581. 
 116. Id. at 584. 
 117. See Cloud v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 720 F.2d 721, 725 (1st Cir. 1983) (“We also examine 
the hearing to ensure that it was conducted with basic fairness.”); Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 
869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt. 1994) (“The College has agreed to provide students with 
proceedings that conform to a standard of ‘fundamental fairness’ and to protect students from 
arbitrary and capricious disciplinary action to the extent possible within the system it has chosen 
to use.”). This standard is uncertain, and there is little case law that provides guidance. Doe v. 
Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 601 (D. Mass. 2016). 
 118. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). 
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However, both OCR and colleges limit student defendants’ 
rights to due process by mandating a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, prohibiting defendants from cross-examining witnesses, 
limiting defendants’ right to counsel, and exhibiting clear biases 
against accused defendants. By labeling a violent act of sexual 
assault as a simple act of sex discrimination, the government 
mandates universities to create an administrative adjudicatory 
process determining guilt for a recognized violent crime on top of 
already existing civil and criminal litigation processes. By creating 
this parallel system, rights that defendants would hold in both civil 
and criminal proceedings are evaded. Student defendants face harsh 
criminal-like penalties for an extremely serious allegation oftentimes 
hinging on witness credibility, yet are provided almost no procedural 
safeguards in this process. 
A.  Preponderance of the Evidence Standard 
The Dear Colleague Letter mandates that college campuses use 
a preponderance of the evidence standard,119 unlike the criminal 
system which utilizes a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.120 While 
the Campus SaVE Act seems to make the preponderance of the 
evidence standard voluntary because it requires only that colleges 
report which type of standard they are going to use, a federal district 
court judge in the District of Columbia recently ruled that this act has 
no effect on Title IX enforcement.121 Thus, colleges are still required 
to utilize a preponderance of the evidence standard, despite 
congressionally mandated federal law suggesting otherwise. 
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he function of a standard of 
proof . . . is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of 
 
 119. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 60, at 4. 
 120. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423–24 (1979). 
 121. See Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 85 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(holding that the Campus SaVE Act did not affect Title IX and did not change how colleges 
process claims of sex discrimination); see also QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 80, at 26, 
44 (mandating that a preponderance of the evidence is required, even after the Campus SaVE Act 
was in effect, and explaining that no part of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act, 
including § 304, relieves a school of its Title IX obligations). Indeed, it seems OCR is still going 
after schools that do not use a preponderance of the evidence standard. In December 2014, OCR 
found Harvard Law School was not in compliance with Title IX, in part because it used the clear 
and convincing standard for sexual misconduct claims. Stephanie Francis Ward, Lawyers Are 
Dealing with Changing Rules on College Sexual Assault, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 2015) [hereinafter 
Crisis of Consent], http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/lawyers_are_dealing_with_ 
changing_rules_on_college_sexual_assault. 
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confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of 
factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’”122 There 
are three different standards which “serve[] to allocate the risk of 
error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance 
attached to the ultimate decision.”123 In cases involving monetary 
disputes between private parties, a mere preponderance of the 
evidence standard is used because society has a minimal concern 
with the outcome.124 In criminal cases, however, a beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard is imposed due to the magnitude of the 
interests of the defendant and to “exclude as nearly as possible the 
likelihood of an erroneous judgment.”125 The intermediate clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing standard is used to protect particularly 
important individual interests in civil cases, such as deportation and 
denaturalization.126 The standard is also used in cases involving 
allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the 
defendant.127 The Supreme Court has said that “[t]he interests at 
stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss 
of money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the 
defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by 
increasing the plaintiff’s burden of proof.”128 
Regardless of whether it is a government-imposed standard or a 
standard chosen by a university, a preponderance of the evidence 
standard is an inappropriate legal standard to use during a sexual 
assault campus disciplinary proceeding. In these cases, defendants do 
not face monetary consequences; rather, they face expulsion and 
stigmatization, and as a result are often not able to transfer to other 
schools or find employment.129 Additionally, those found guilty of 
sexual assault face substantial reputational injury in their 
professional and social lives.130 This can result in total destruction of 
a defendant’s future. Due to the magnitude of the interests involved 
in campus sexual assault adjudications, anything less than a 
 
 122. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 424. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See supra notes 32–35. 
 130. Id. 
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reasonable doubt standard provides defendants with an unfairly 
biased trial. 
The Department of Education argues that schools must use a 
preponderance of the evidence standard to be consistent with Title IX 
standards because they use a preponderance of the evidence standard 
in evaluating Title IX complaints that determine school fund 
termination.131 It also points to the Supreme Court’s use of a 
preponderance of the evidence standard in civil litigation involving 
discrimination under Title VII.132 However, these comparisons fall 
flat. The issues at stake in Title IX cases, Title VII cases, and any 
complaints or administrative hearings involving the Department of 
Education involve monetary issues, not determining a student’s guilt 
in a sexual assault allegation and subsequently expelling the student 
from college. A college disciplinary proceeding determines whether 
the accused is guilty, whereas OCR evaluates whether a school’s 
response to the alleged sexual assault was unreasonable.133 Under a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, campus adjudications place 
accused students into a metaphorical prison cell by the most 
undemanding standard, a standard that society has otherwise deemed 
unacceptable in a criminal proceeding for the exact same charge. 
B.  Cross-examination 
Student defendants are oftentimes prohibited from confronting 
and cross-examining alleged victims and other adverse witnesses.134 
OCR discourages allowing alleged perpetrators from questioning 
alleged victims because it could be traumatic or intimidating, thereby 
possibly escalating or perpetuating a hostile environment.135 
Defendants are also prohibited from asking witnesses questions 
directly in interviews or hearings.136 If a witness wants 
 
 131. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 60, at 11.  
 132. Id. at 10. 
 133. Hendrix, supra note 42, at 610. 
 134. See, e.g., Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 604 (D. Mass. 2016) (The 
defendant was not permitted to cross-examine his accuser, either directly or through counsel.); 
Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 479, 505 (Ct. App. 2016) (The defendant and 
his attorney were not permitted to directly cross-examine the accuser, and the Panel Chair asked 
less than one-third of the defendant’s questions.); Carle, supra note 31 (In 2011, Yale reported 
thirteen student sexual assault allegations. None of the accused students were permitted to cross-
examine their accusers.). 
 135. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 60, at 12. 
 136. Crisis of Consent, supra note 121. 
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confidentiality, his or her identity is not shared with the accused.137 
However, due to the strong interests of the defendant in avoiding 
expulsion and permanent stigmatization and the fact that these cases 
turn on issues of witness credibility, alleged perpetrators should have 
a right to cross-examine both their accusers and adverse witnesses. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, criminal defendants have a 
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against them.138 This 
right is circumvented by using an administrative process rather than a 
criminal prosecution. While the Supreme Court has not specifically 
spoken on the right of defendants in campus tribunals to cross-
examine their accusers,139 it has spoken clearly and loudly on the 
issue of cross-examining witnesses in administrative proceedings, 
finding that “[i]n almost every setting where important decisions turn 
on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront 
and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”140 Sexual assault cases almost 
always turn on questions of fact determined by the credibility of the 
accuser and accused.141 Thus, these are the very cases that should 
require the defendant the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses 
in order to satisfy fundamental due process. Further, although some 
courts suggest that at a minimum, cross-examination may be 
appropriate when asked through a third party142 (who may pick and 
choose which submitted questions to ask143), this kind of cross-
examination is not nearly effective as a cross-examination from a 
seasoned attorney, who is able to ask effective follow-up questions 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 139. Lower courts have noted that while the right to cross-examination is not one required for 
due process in school disciplinary proceedings, when a case turns on credibility, the “cross-
examination of witnesses might [be] essential to a fair hearing.” Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 
at 605 (quoting Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
 140. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). 
 141. See, e.g., Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 605 (“The entire investigation thus turned 
on the credibility of the accuser and the accused.”); Donohue, 976 F. Supp. at 146 (“[T]he 
determination of whether sexual misconduct occurred here largely turned on the credibility of [the 
defendant] and the plaintiff.”); Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 479, 504 (Ct. 
App. 2016) (“[T]he Panel’s findings are likely to turn on the credibility of the complainant . . . .”). 
 142. Donohue, 976 F. Supp. at 147; Regents of Univ. of Cal., 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 504. 
 143. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 210 Cal. Rptr. at 504–06. The court held that while only nine of 
thirty-two cross-examination questions were asked, there is no requirement under California law 
that requires cross-examination in an administrative hearing. Id. at 504. It then listed some of the 
questions not asked at the hearing, and held that the procedure was fair because those questions 
had already been asked or the answers had already been provided either in the report prepared by 
the school, in another part of the hearing, or in other documents provided to the panel. Id. at 505–
06. This is contrary to the cross-examination process in any civil or criminal trial. 
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depending on a complainant’s answers. Undoubtedly, a defendant 
accused of sexual assault should have the right to fully cross-
examine both the complainant and other adverse witnesses.  
C.  Right to Counsel 
While OCR does allow schools to permit parties to have lawyers 
at any stage of the proceedings, it does not require schools to allow 
them.144 The Campus SaVE Act does allow parties to have an 
advisor of their choice present at a hearing, but does not specify 
whether this may be an attorney or whether the advisor may speak.145 
Many universities either do not allow for attorneys at all or severely 
limit the scope of an attorney’s representation.146 For example, in one 
case, an attorney was allowed to participate up until the most 
important part of the process—the hearing itself.147 This means that 
despite defendants being subject to a preponderance of the evidence 
standard used in civil cases, they are oftentimes not offered the same 
protection of having an attorney present.148 
First, students should have the right to hire their own attorney in 
campus sexual assault tribunals.149 Without an attorney present, 
students may either choose to fully defend themselves and risk self-
incrimination and exposing strengths and weaknesses of their case to 
a criminal prosecutor, or choose to not contest the school’s charges 
and face expulsion. Further, if a student is prohibited from cross-
examining his or her accuser and is also prohibited from having an 
 
 144. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 60, at 12. 
 145. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 304(a)(5), 
127 Stat. 54, 91 (2013) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iv)(II)). 
 146. Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, supra note 67. 
 147. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 503. 
 148. Writer Says That Some Who Believe College Rape Cases Should Be Handled by the 
Criminal Justice System Are Practicing ‘A Subtle Misogny,’ CMTY. OF THE WRONGLY ACCUSED 
(May 18, 2015, 8:58 AM), http://www.cotwa.info/2015/05/writer-says-that-some-who-believe. 
html. 
 149. Eugene Volokh, Open Letter from 16 Penn Law School Professors About Title IX and 
Sexual Assault Complaints, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/02/19/open-letter-from-16-penn-law-school-professors-ab 
out-title-ix-and-sexual-assault-complaints (Fundamental fairness requires “the right to the 
assistance of counsel in preparation for and conduct of the hearing.”); Rethink Harvard’s Sexual 
Harassment Policy, supra note 67 (raising concerns about “[t]he failure to ensure adequate 
representation for the accused”); see Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 604 (D. Mass. 
2016) (“Brandeis engaged an outside attorney, presumably with years of experience and training, 
to investigate and prosecute serious charges of sexual assault and other sexual misconduct. But it 
expected a student, approximately 21 years old, with no legal training or background, to defend 
himself, alone, against those same charges.”). 
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attorney, any kind of meaningful cross-examination is impossible. 
With an issue as serious as sexual assault, which oftentimes hinges 
on witness credibility, students should undoubtedly have the right to 
hire their own attorney. 
Second, not only should students be allowed attorneys, but 
defendants unable to afford counsel on their own should be provided 
an attorney.150 The criminal system has long recognized the 
constitutional right to court-appointed counsel for those who cannot 
afford an attorney.151 However, by adjudicating sexual assault crimes 
through campus tribunals rather than the criminal system, this right is 
completely evaded. Thus, student defendants face harsh criminal-like 
penalties for recognized violent crimes, yet they are not provided the 
same constitutional safeguards. 
D.  Inherent Bias 
Rather than an unbiased jury deciding guilt, biased school 
administrators who have strong financial incentives decide 
responsibility in these cases. College campuses have enormous 
financial incentives in sexual assault cases because acquitting an 
accused student carries the threat that OCR could exercise its 
enforcement authority.152 If found guilty in such an investigation, a 
college could face losing over half a billion dollars in federal 
funding.153 All but a handful colleges in America depend on these 
finances to run, and could be forced to shut down without them. 
Even if schools did not shut down, students could lose desperately 
needed grant and loan money,154 forcing them to pay tuition out-of-
pocket or drop out of school. 
As a result of OCR investigations, many schools have set out 
harsh reform policies to their sexual assault procedures in an effort to 
avoid losing federal funding.155 For example, in July 2014, as a result 
 
 150. See Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, supra note 67 (raising concerns about 
“[t]he failure to ensure adequate representation for the accused, particularly for students unable to 
afford representation”). 
 151. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 152. Henrick, supra note 38, at 81. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Fast Facts: Financial Aid, NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/ 
display.asp?id=31 (last visited Aug. 7, 2016) (In 2013–14, 85% of students at four-year 
undergraduate institutions received financial aid.). 
 155. Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, supra note 67. Fifteen years prior to these 
OCR investigations, Justice Kennedy warned that “[t]he prospect of unlimited Title IX liability 
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of being investigated for Title IX violations, Harvard University 
introduced a new university-wide policy aimed at preventing sexual 
harassment and sexual violence based on gender, sexual orientation, 
and gender identity.156 Twenty-eight Harvard Law professors wrote a 
letter, calling the policy “inconsistent with many of the most basic 
principles we teach.”157 They described how it lacked the basic 
elements of fairness and due process and how it was overwhelmingly 
stacked against the accused.158 
Schools also run the risk of being sued by individual students 
under Title IX violations, which could cost them millions of 
dollars.159 In fact, there have been several high-profile monetary 
settlements for complainants, including Simpson v. University of 
Colorado, which settled for $2.85 million, and Williams v. Board of 
Regents of the University System of Georgia, which settled for an 
undisclosed six-figure sum.160 While sexual assault complainants 
may sue a university over deliberate indifference to a sexual 
harassment grievance, student defendants face a more difficult path, 
as they are required to show an erroneous finding that occurred as a 
result of sex bias.161 This means that even if a school reacts to an 
accused student’s innocence with deliberate indifference, the student 
has no established Title IX right “per se indicative of sexual 
discrimination.”162 Therefore, to avoid risk, colleges have a strong 
incentive to convict accused students.163 This effectively creates a 
loophole around the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison.164 
Rather than complainants suing their alleged attackers directly, 
alleged victims simply incentivize schools to punish those accused of 
 
will, in all likelihood, breed a climate of fear.” Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 
681 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 156. Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, supra note 67. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Henrick, supra note 38, at 74–75. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994). However, while the two-
prong test established in Yusuf still remains in effect, the Second Circuit recently eased the 
required pleading standard, adopting the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework set 
forth in Title VII cases. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a student must merely allege facts 
that support a minimal plausible inference that (1) there was an erroneous finding, and (2) sex 
bias was a motivating factor behind the erroneous finding. Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 
56 (2d Cir. 2016); Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715. 
 162. Henrick, supra note 38, at 75. 
 163. Id. at 74. 
 164. Id. 
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sexual violence in order to avoid costly lawsuits.165 
In addition to financial interests, schools have an interest in 
maintaining their reputation, and administrators have personal 
interests in keeping their jobs.166 While in the past a school’s interest 
in its reputation caused “shameful indifference to sexual assault,”167 
colleges today have an interest in not “being branded ‘soft’ on sexual 
assault by victims’ rights groups and by the media.”168 In fact, one 
school administrator noted he acted in ways he could not justify to 
himself out of fear for his institution’s reputation: 
[M]y fear—yes, it’s fear—of seeing my institution’s name 
in Inside Higher Ed or The Chronicle of Higher Education 
as the subject of an investigation, or, even worse, having the 
“letter of agreement” OCR makes public displayed for all to 
read—makes me toe the line in a way I sometimes have 
trouble justifying to myself.169 
Additionally, unlike the criminal system, which has separate 
entities performing various aspects of the case, a university performs 
the “functions of investigation, prosecution, fact-finding, and 
appellate review in one office, and . . . that office is itself a Title IX 
compliance office rather than an entity that could be considered 
structurally impartial.”170 Wielding absolute authority, “[t]hey 
evaluate the evidence and determine the facts. Without attorneys 
present to counter unreasonable claims or object to a line of 
questioning, nervous panelists often subject witnesses to random 
and/or incriminating questions.”171 An impartial trial with fair 
evidence is simply nonexistent when the investigator, prosecutor, 
judge, and jury are one and the same.172 Sixteen Pennsylvania Law 
School professors wrote a letter asking why the federal government 
requires such serious cases to be handled by academics in campus 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 81. 
 167. Id. at 82. 
 168. Id. 
 169. An Open Letter to OCR, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 28, 2011), https://www.inside 
highered.com/views/2011/10/28/essay-ocr-guidelines-sexual-assault-hurt-colleges-and-students. 
 170. Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, supra note 67. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 606 (D. Mass. 2016) (“The dangers of 
combining in a single individual the power to investigate, prosecute, and convict, with little 
effective power of review, are obvious.”). 
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adjudications, rather than by professional judges and lawyers.173 
They propose that “[p]erhaps it is time to funnel the more serious 
cases through the criminal justice process and to make that process 
much more accessible to and supportive of sexual assault 
complainants.”174 Indeed, perhaps it is time to let the justice system 
do what it is designed to do. 
Finally, universities suffer from bias due to the particular 
ideological beliefs of the institution.175 Universities strongly favor 
rights of female complainants and presume male defendants guilty 
before proven innocent. For example, at Stanford University, the 
school training manual instructs judicial panelists that “persuasive 
and logical” behavior is a sign of defendant’s guilt and that 
“[e]veryone should be very, very cautious in accepting a man’s claim 
that he has been wrongly accused of abuse or violence. The great 
majority of allegations of abuse—though not all—are substantially 
accurate. An abuser almost never ‘seems like the type.’”176 At Duke 
University, Dean Sue Wasiolek stated that if a male and female were 
both unable to give consent because they were intoxicated, “it is the 
responsibility in the case of the male to gain consent before 
proceeding with sex.”177 Ironically, these instructions create the very 
sex discrimination they were meant to prevent. They favor female 
complainants and shatter the fundamental basis of our justice system, 
which presumes a defendant is innocent until proven guilty. 
A general training guide used by universities also largely favors 
the rights of the accuser, with the tips favoring a panelist to find 
guilt.178 For example, one of the “tips” states: “False allegations of 
rape are not common.”179 The “tip” explained this by stating that 
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recent research at a major northeastern university suggested that over 
a ten-year period, 5.9% of its cases involved false allegations and 
that “reputable” research placed the rate in the general population 
between 2% and 10%.180 However, data suggests that this number 
ranges from 9% to 50%.181 Further, despite explaining that this “tip” 
is based on “reputable” research, the guide provides only one 
citation.182 The sole citation is an article co-authored by David Lisak, 
which includes a study of 136 cases over a ten-year period and 
critiques of other existing research.183 Notably, the “tip” also fails to 
explain that Lisak’s study showed that 44.9% of the 136 cases did 
not proceed to any prosecution or disciplinary action because of 
insufficient evidence, accusation withdrawal, failure to identify the 
alleged perpetrator, or mischaracterization of the incident.184 An 
additional 13.9% of the 136 cases were unable to be assigned into a 
category due to insufficient information regarding the incident, such 
as the victim or alleged perpetrator not being identified.185 This leads 
one to wonder what does constitute a false allegation. Lisak defines it 
narrowly: “The determination that a report of sexual assault is false 
can be made only if the evidence establishes that no crime was 
committed or attempted.”186 Essentially, it is only a false allegation if 
there is a zero percent chance the accused student is guilty.187 Not 
only is this tip based on a disputed statistic, but it essentially dispels 
the need to look at the facts in the case because by definition, the 
facts are irrelevant.188 The allegation alone implies guilt. Therefore, 
our system of jurisprudence is highly distorted. On the other side of 
the spectrum, some schools treat athletes as demi-gods,189 presuming 
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them innocent even when there may be clear evidence showing guilt. 
It is the same problem, but with a different predetermined outcome. 
Justice must be objective and blind; campuses are neither. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that campus adjudications suffer from a 
serious lack of due process for the accused. However, campus 
adjudications cannot be “fixed” by adding more due process rights 
for defendants because fundamentally, campus adjudications cannot 
ever provide the proper level of due process. Even if OCR amended 
its guidelines and mandated a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, 
right to counsel, and right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, the 
trial would still suffer from extreme bias and clear conflicts of 
interest. A fair trial is impossible when a school administrator plays 
the roles of investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury. It is impossible 
when the person playing these roles also suffers from personal and 
financial incentives. Ultimately, “[a] school is an academic 
institution, not a courtroom or administrative hearing room,”190 and it 
is impossible for a school to fairly adjudicate a recognized violent 
crime. 
Campus sexual assault adjudications represent a shift in 
attempting to circumvent the existing legal apparatus in favor of a 
regulatory apparatus to adjudicate criminal behavior. In the effort to 
accomplish this, a violent crime has been turned into a simple act of 
discrimination. Defendants in these proceedings have lost basic and 
fundamental due process rights and the very biases our justice system 
aims to eliminate are pushed to the center stage. These kangaroo 
courts created by the Department of Education and college campuses 
are the antithesis of our justice system and should be eliminated to 
ensure the ideals of justice, liberty, and freedom on the very 
campuses these procedures purportedly serve to protect. We all agree 
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